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NOTES AND COMMENTS
While the Court's statement was perhaps intended to provide the
Court some escape from holding against the shipowner in every injury
case remotely connected with either the ship or its personnel, it re-
mains open to some doubt how far the holding in Mitchell will be taken
to impose its newly found- duty of the shipowner to provide a seaworthy
ship at all times. To use another example, a ship at sea encounters a
severe storm the force of which weakens the mast, thereby rendering
the ship unseaworthy. Subsequently while the ship is limping into
port where she can be repaired, the mast topples, striking and injuring
a seaman. If the shipowner incurs liability in such a case, it is difficult
to see how his duty to provide the requisite seaworthy ship can be
fulfilled while his ship is yet at sea and beyond the reach of harbor
repair facilities.
The dissent in Mitchell took the view that the Court's decision vir-
tually made the shipowner an insurer of the seaman, whereas the doc-
trine of unseaworthiness originated in both English and American
courts as a means of protecting marine cargo insurance carriers from
undue risks.
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion is the sounder, for it
recognizes that the doctrine of unseaworthiness was called into exist-
ence for one reason-the encouragement of marine insurance. It also
recognizes that the doctrine has undergone its expansion since that time
through some dubious judicial precedent. And with the decision in
the principal case it is seen that perhaps the last vestige of the his-
torical doctrine of unseaworthiness has been cast off-that element which
required the shipowner to make his ship safe for the impending voy-
age while the ship is yet in port. The shipowner is now liable without
fault before,2 9 during,3 0 and after 31 the voyage to a seaman (or one
doing a seaman's work) injured aboard his ship.
HOWARD A. KNOX, JR.
Domestic Relations-Basis of the Award of Alimony Pendente
Lite in North Carolina.
Alimony pendente lite may be awarded to any married woman up-
on her application to the court with notice to her husband during any
proceeding for absolute divorce, divorce from bed and board, or ali-
mony without divorce.1 She may receive the award whether she be
the plaintiff or the defendant in the principal action.2 If the wife is
"Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).IoMahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
"Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 50-15 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5046 (Supp. 1959).
'Johnson v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 383, 75 S.E2d 109 (1953) ; Medlin v. Medlin,
175 N.C. 529, 95 S.E. 857 (1918) ; Webber v. Webber, 79 N.C. 572 (1878).
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merely defending the action brought by her husband and asking for
no affirmative relief, she may receive alimony pendente lite "upon a
proper showing."'3  In order for the wife to be eligible for the award
when she is seeking an absolute divorce, divorce from bed and board,
or alimony without divorce, she must set forth sufficient facts (1) to
entitle her to a divorce, either absolute or from bed and board,4 and
(2) to establish that she does not have adequate means of support
during the trial.5  Having found these facts in her favor, the court
may then order her husband to pay her "such alimony during the
pendency of the suit as appears to [it] ... just and proper, having re-
gard to the circumstances of the parties."
The amount of the award is within the sound discretion of the court,
and there will be no reversal on appeal unless there is a gross abuse of
discretion.7 There are, however, two factors that weigh upon the
exercise of the trial court's discretion-one the provision of a statute
and the other a judicial decision. G.S. § 50-14 provides that alimony
awarded upon divorce from bed and board shall not exceed one-third
of the net income of the party against whom the judgment is rendered.
'Johnson v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 383, 75 S.E2d 109 (1953) ; the court does not
say what will constitute a "proper showing." Briggs v. Briggs, 215 N.C. 78, 1
S.E2d 118 (1939), and Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662, 200 S.E. 436(1939), indicate that the trial court need merely find that the wife's denial is
filed in good faith and that she is without adequate means of support.
"The court need not determine the type divorce to which she would be en-
titled. Little v. Little, 63 N.C. 22 (1868).
'It would appear that where the wife has ample means for her support she
will not be granted alimony pendente lite. Oliver v. Oliver, 219 N.C. 299, 13
S.E2d 549 (1941). But see Mercer v. Mercer, 253 N.C. 164, 116 S.E2d 443
(1960), where an award of $1000 plus $500 a month to a wife who had a separate
eshtte of $47,500 and an income of $6400"was sustained. The husband's estate was
valued at several hundred thousand dollars. (These figures were before the trial
court but are not in the report.) The court stated that under G.S. § 50-16 "the
fact that she has a separate estate of her own does not necessarily defeat her
right to [alimony pendente lite] .... " Id, at 170, 116 S.E2d at 448. Accord:
Rowland v. Rowland, 253 N.C. 328, 116 S.E2d 795 (1960). When the court at
the pendente lite stage examines the quality of the support due the wife according
to the means of the husband, as would be done in a permanent alimony situation,
rather than looking to her needs in excess of the amount she alone can provide,
it would appear that the literal meaning of Q.S. § 50-15 is being ignored. G.S.
§ 50-15 requires that before an award of alimony pendente lite be given the wife
the trial court must find that "she has.not sufficient means whereon to subsist dur-
ing the prosecution of the suit." But in Rowland and Mercer the awards were
made under G.S. § 50-16. That statute has no explicit requirement of such a
finding and only requires that the award be reasonable subsistence having regard
to the circumstances of both parties. Apparently G.S. § 50-15 and G.S. § 50-16
are not to be construed in pari materia.
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-15 (1950) N.C. Gmr. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1959)
uses substantially the same language and the court has not drawn a distinction
(except as suggested in note 5, supra). Under G.S. § 50-16 adultery on the part
of the wife bars all relief except counsel fees, whereas this result is questionable
under G.S. § 50-15. Bolin v. Bolin, 242 N.C. 642, 89 S.E.2d 303 (1955) (G.S.
§ 50-15); Williams v. Williams, 230 N.C. 660, 55 S.E.2d 195 (1949) (G.S. § 50-
16) ; Lawrence v Lawrence, 226 N.C. 221, 37 S.E.2d 496 (1946) (G.S. § 50-15).
SHennis v. Hennis, 180 N.C. 606, 105 S.E. 274 (1920).
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While at least one case has indicated that this one-third limitation is
not binding upon the trial court on the question of alimony pendente
lite,s our court has also said that due regard must be given to this ex-
pression of legislative intent.9 Further, Davidson v. Davidson'0 holds
that the award shall not exceed the net income that "is or should be
derived ' "1 from the estate or labor of the party ordered to pay alimony
pendente lite.
In determining the amount of the award, a significant problem is
that of the husband's ability to pay; this factor has been the subject
of two recent cases before the North Carolina Supreme Court.'2
In Conrad v. Conrad13 plaintiff wife, who was seeking alimony
without divorce, moved for alimony pendente lite. The substance of
the evidence concerning the husband's ability to pay was that as an
insurance salesman his net income during prior years had been
$10,756.16 in 1956, $15,357.94 in 1957, $8,477 in 1958 and $3,916.43
for the first eight months of 1959. Defendant husband explained his
decline in income by a reduction in commissions paid by one of his
largest accounts and an unfavorable ruling by the local insurance
board. It was not contended that the defendant had assets other than
his income capacity.' 4 The trial court found that the defendant was
capable of earning $16,000 a year and awarded the wife $600 a month
alimony pendente lite and $1,000 counsel fees. The Supreme Court
reversed. The court stated that the award is to be based on current
earnings, not upon earnings for some prior year, and that before an
award may be based upon earning capacity the trial court should find
that the husband was failing to exercise his capacity to earn. because
of a disregard of his marital obligation to provide a resonable sup-
port for his wife.
To support its requirement of a finding that the husband has disre-
garded his support obligations the court cited Davidson v. Davidson.'5
In the Davidson case the trial court had awarded alimony pendente
lite which exceeded the net income of the defendant. Although the
court conceded that the award may be based on the income capacity
' Anderson v. Anderson, 183 N.C. 139, 110 S.E. 863 (1922).
'Kiser. v. Kiser, 203 N.C. 428, 166 S.E. 304 (1932) ;, Davidson v. Davidson,
189 N.C. 625, 127 S.E. 682 (1925).10189 N.C. 625, 127 S.E. 682 (1925).11Id. at 628, 127 S.E. at 683.
1 Conrad v. Conrad, 252 N.C. 412, 113 S.E. 2d 912 (1960) ; Sguros v. Sguros,
252 N.C. 408, 114 S.E.2d 79 (1960).
18252 N.C. 412, 113 S.E. 2d 912 (1960).
" Cf. Muse v. Muse, 84 N.C. 35 (1879), where an award of three dollars a
month based on income capacity alone was sustained, there being no evidence of
any other asset belonging to the husband.
" 189 N.C. 625, 127 S.E. 682 (1925).
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of the husband,16 it reversed the trial court and the case was remanded
for additional evidence concerning the value of the husband's "entire
estate, and the net annual income that is or should be derived from his
estate or labor."'1 7  The court further stated that the ultimate object
of the proceedings was to award such alimony pendente lite as was
"just and proper having regard to the circumstances of the parties."18
If there was any doubt after Davidson as to whether the "circumstances
of the parties" provision required a finding that the husband had dis-
regarded his support obligations in order to sustain an award based on
the husband's earning capacity instead of his present earnings, there
should certainly be none after Conrad.
The husband's ability to pay arose in a different context in Sguros
v. Sguros,19 the second of these two recent cases. Plaintiff wife was
seeking alimony without divorce and moved for alimony pendente lite.
Defendant husband had a Ph.D. degree in bacteriology and at the time
the action was instituted was employed as a tobacco research technician
at an annual salary of $10,740. He had an additional income from a
Naval Reserve unit of about $1,000 a year. He had, however, resigned
from these positions and accepted a professorship at a salary of $8,000
a year. He filed an affidavit stating that the opportunities for advance-
ment in his field were greater as a university teacher than as a research
technician. There was no finding that there was any other reason for
his change of positions. The trial court awarded -alimony pendente
lite based on an annual income of $11,800. On appeal the supreme
court said, "Under the circumstances here disclosed, we hold he had
the right, so long as he acted in good faith, to accept the professor-
ship at Miami even though at a reduction in salary. The court should
have fixed the monthly payments on the basis of a salary of $8,000.""
The requirement that the husband must act in good faith in chang-
ing jobs could present a difficult question for the trial court to decide.2 '
16 "The allowance may be based on the husband's earnings, or his earning
capacity, although he is not possessed of money or property." Davidson v. David-
son, 189 N.C. 625, 628, 127 S.E. 682, 683 (1925), quoting Corpus .uris.
.7 189 N.C. at 627, 127 S.E. at 683.18 Id. at 628, 127 S.E. at 683.
" 252 N.C. 408, 114 S.E.2d 79 (1960).
2 0 Id. t 411, 114 S.E.2d at 82.
"
1If, for example, the husband were a baseball player who had for a long time
been considering entering the sporting goods business and retiring from active
sports and if he refused an offer of $100,000 for another year's play and entered
business for $25,000 a year during the -pendency of divorce proceedings, nothing
else appearing, Sguros would require that the court award alimony based an the
$25,000 job. When, however, the husband's decision to change jobs occurs ap-
parently concurrently with the divorce proceedings, then it is open to question
whether the same result would follow. Conrad and Sguros are not clear as to
whether there is a presumption of good faith on the part of the husband. The
problem of the husband's earning capacity, his good faith, etc., also arises in con-
nection with the modification of permanent alimony decrees. See generally,
Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 10 (1951).
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In Sguros the husband's change in jobs was presented in the most fav-
orable light. He was a professional man seeking advancement and
entering a highly respected new career. The appellate record indicates
that the issue of good faith was not strongly contested.2 2 There was no
evidence offered to dispute his motive. But in future cases the question
might arise whether the change in jobs would have been made had
domestic harmony continued. If it were shown that the husband would
not have changed jobs but for the discord, then perhaps an award based
upon earning capacity would be sustained.
It is submitted that Conrad and Sguros are consistent and reason-
able. Both require that the intent of the husband be examined before
an award of alimony pendente lite may be based upon the husband's
earning capacity.23 In both the basic issue is the same, i.e., Is the
husband by changing jobs and reducing his income primarily moti-
vated by a desire to avoid his support obligations? If this issue is
answered affirmatively, the wife may be awarded alimony pendente
lite based upon the husband's earning capacity; otherwise the award
must be based upon his present earnings. This appears to be a reason-
able result, for the husband should not be absolutely prohibited from
changing jobs. And, at the same time, the wife's right to support
should not be infringed when the husband does change jobs primarily
for the purpose of reducing his income and thereby the amount of
support.2 4
G. DUDLEY HUMPHREY, JR.
Evidence-Inadmissibility of State-Seized Evidence in Federal
Criminal Prosecutions-Silver Platter Doctrine.
In Elkins v. United States1 defendants were indicted in a United
States district court in Oregon for violating and for conspiracy to vi-
olate the Federal Communications Act. Before trial the defendants
moved to suppress as evidence several recordings and a recording ma-
chine which had been seized by state officers and turned over to federal
officials. The state officers had seized the evidence during a search
22 See Brief for Appellee, p. 21.
2" "The award should be based on the amount which defendant is earning
when alimony is sought and the award made, if the husband is honestly engaged
in a business to which he is properly adapted and is in fact seeking to operate
his business profitably. Sguros v. Sguros, ante, 408. To base an award on
capacity to earn rather than actual earnings, there should be a finding based on
evidence that the husband was failing to exercise his capacity to earn because of
a disregard of his marital obligation to provide reasonable support for his
wife... ." Conrad v. Conrad, 252 N.C. 412, 418, 113 S.E.2d 912, 916 (1960).
(Emphasis added.)
" The same reasoning applies where a reduction in the husband's income has
occurred without a change in jobs.
1364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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